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INTRODUCTION 
In the twentieth century the world has experienced substantial growth in 
the demand for fresh water for agriculture and industry along with a decline in 
the uncontaminated supply of this resource. Rather than seeing the geopolitical 
concern of water access recede as technology diversifies our means of consump-
tion and substitution, we have witnessed unprecedented attention focused on this 
most traditional natural resource. International river basins, historically cradles 
of modern civilization, have been transformed into tense arenas for competitive 
exploitation by neighboring nations. As a result, it has become increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between water as an environmental issue and water as a 
national security issue, and international disputes have arisen almost everywhere 
among the users of the world's waterways. 
Given that water is the most vital resource needed to sustain human life, 
it is perhaps not surprising that over forty percent of the world's population lives 
in river basins shared by more than two nations. ' No other natural resource has 
as many uses as a river:2 these include hydroelectric power generation, 
navigation, drinking water, fishing, irrigation, recreation and tourism, preserva-
tion of nature, waste disposal, flood prevention, and demarcating political or 
ethnic boundaries. Because river water is continuously in motion, issues of 
control, jurisdiction, and sovereignty are much more complicated than when 
dealing with static land resources.3 Unlike most other natural resources, these 
water needs are generally such that a local source is critical, eliminating the 
option of supplementing immediate supply with water imports from outside the 
region. Due to differences in national perspectives, international rivers with 
shared freshwater resources pose particular problems and tend to suffer greater 
environmental damage and to experience less productive utilization than com-
parable exclusively national water resources.4 Thus the characteristics of 
international river basins combine to create the most complex challenge for 
effective resource management. 
While extensive probing has occurred into the nature of water conflict 
involving particularrivers or within particular regions, relatively little overarching 
insight has emerged concerning the theoretical roots and global patterns of 
international river basin conflict. As Frederick Frey and Thomas Naff3 point out, 
"because of its sheer complexity in practical, ideological, and symbolic terms, 
the issue of water is more difficult for policy makers and scholars to grasp in its 
entirety and tends to be dealt with piecemeal both domestically and internation-
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ally." Furthermore, David LeMarquand6 notes that even when general research 
has emerged concerning international rivers, it has focused more on legal and 
administrative aspects of management than on the reasons for the relative lack 
of success in achieving international cooperation on this issue. This study 
attempts to begin to fulfill that conceptual and empirical void. It presents as a 
background context a new general model tying together the explanatory ele-
ments involved in precipitating such disputes, introduces some hypotheses 
distinguishing distinctive patterns of international river basin conflict, and then 
analyzes a series of case studies to explore the validity of the hypotheses. 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
The sources of disputes over international river basins encompass consid-
erations from fields as diverse as ecology, economics, political psychology, 
religion, cultural anthropology and geopolitics. Certain précipitants come 
logically to the forefront, however, and this study specifically suggests a three-
stage explanatory process involving a non-cooperative setting, environmental 
imbalance, and power asymmetry. Figure 1 shows the sequence involved in the 
model as a whole. 
As the figure indicates, the three elements of this causal model have their 
impact on the potential for conflict roughly in the specified time sequence. The 
first element — a non-cooperative setting — is a key background irritant 
fostering conflict because this condition induces a predisposition to perceive the 
river basin predicament and other riparian7 states' motivations in a hostile way 
and thus to impede resolution of contentious issues. The second element — 
environmental imbalance — is a major source of frustration promoting conflict 
by building on pre-existing antagonisms caused by the gap between aspirations 
and reality in water access. This leads both to an inability to meet domestic needs 
and to a sense that the distribution of this resource is unfair and degrading. The 
third element — power asymmetry — is an immediate trigger for conflict once 
the other two elements are in place. This condition provides the means for the 
existing tensions identified above to be translated into unrestrained confidence 
on the part of one or more riparian states to initiate and carry through conflict 
successfully. While the first two elements explain the motives and intentions of 
conflict-prone riparian states, this last element emphasizes the facilitating or 
limiting impact of national capabilities. From a conceptual perspective, each of 
the three elements appears equally important — with no ranking or weighting 
scheme warranted — and mutually reinforcing over time. 
More specifically, looking at the first component — a non-cooperative 
setting—the most important facet is the existence of ongoing ethnic, religious, 
or ideological antagonisms in the river region. The river itself may: split 
geographically key ethnic, religious, or ideological groups; function as a tangible 
resource support for the distinctive lifestyles of these groups; or simply serve as 
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a symbolic psychological focus for pre-existing hostility. In the first case, the 
roots of this antagonism are often geopolitical sphere-of-influence concerns, in 
which issues of sovereignty and territoriality impede efforts to move toward 
sound international river management; in the second case, ecological impedi-
ments relating to usable water allocation; in the third case, a mixture of both. 
Moreover, if past efforts on the part of the riparian nations had yielded little 
progress in settling differences about river use in a mutually satisfactory way, a 
sense of cynicism and frustration would seem likely to dominate consideration 
of possible future moves. In other words, if there is a combination of pre-existing 
hostility and a defeatist attitude about the likely success of any river management 
structure, tension would seem to escalate. Regarding riparian antagonism, Evan 
Vlachos8 confirms the importance of these concerns when he notes the frequent 
tendency of differences in the historical and cultural practices of riparian nations 
to create problems for international river management; Sandra Postel9 empha-
sizes specifically the central importance of "contentious political relations" and 
"religious and ethnic tensions" in global water management; and LeMarquand10 
contends that "a history of mistrust and ill will" aggravate river management 
problems. Regarding previous progress in river negotiations, Naff and Ruth 
Matson' ' point out that the inadequacy of pre-existing legal structures and water 
management plans leaves a void in which conflict can easily develop. 
Turning to environmental imbalance, scarcity is at the core of the 
problem. On the supply side, the contamination of river water may be growing 
— and thus the amount of usable water contracting — due to exposure to 
increasing amounts of both human/animal (organic) waste and industrial (largely 
inorganic) waste; and decreasing ecological diversity in the water system as a 
consequence of the waste and over-exploitation. On the demand side, the use of 
river water may be growing due to increasing human population, generated 
internally or externally through migration; and increasing urbanization, indus-
trialization (including the use of hydroelectric power), and agriculture (espe-
cially through irrigation efforts). While the bottlenecks engendered by this 
supply/demand squeeze seem quite real and heavily influenced by long-term 
ecological trends, the potential certainly exists for riparian nations to exaggerate 
the level of scarcity and to indulge in finger-pointing about blame for the 
pressured predicament. General studies12 of the link between resource scarcity 
and conflict emphasize that frustration may emerge as a result of such scarcity 
when expectations from the past exceed current achievements; that this frustra-
tion may be most acute if existing scarcity represents a dramatic change from 
previous resource abundance; and that perceived and real vulnerability to 
resource disruption may be the result. With specific respect to international river 
basins, Frey and Naff13 rather sweepingly assert that the scarcity of water "is 
always a zero-sum security issue and thus creates a constant potential for 
conflict." Philip Quigg14 notes that when competition for limited water exists 
under scarcity, a pernicious conflict-enhancing process occurs in which "users 
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outdo one another in consumption in order to sustain their claim into the future." 
Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll15 indicate that for both the supply and demand ends 
of scarcity, inefficient maintenance and improper operation of water facilities 
may be a key cause of international river crises. 
Compounding the scarcity dilemma may be a second environmental 
imbalance reflected in the uneven distribution of international river water. A 
substantial part of this inequality results from a geographical "luck-of-the-draw" 
as to how human population disperses near a major river basin. But, even more 
specifically, the distribution of water can be the product of the extent to which 
upstream river users need to care about the needs of downstream users. Often 
the difference in water availability or water quality is dramatic, and the sense of 
distributional inequality is usually associated with feelings of inequity and the 
need for redress. Most general analyses16 find that growing resource inequality 
promotes conflict because no safety net exists at the bottom and the intolerable 
discrepancies in resource consumption and living standards may entice those 
without needed resources to become desperate. Dealing more specifically with 
water, Richard Barnet17 points out that "the global maldistribution of water is 
even more pronounced than the maldistribution of energy or food," and that the 
"enormous" escalation of water use in developed nations along with recurring 
drought conditions in the developing world increase the potential for tension and 
resentment. With particular reference to international river basin issues, 
LeMarquand18 contends that "the uneven distribution of positive and negative 
impacts from the use of resources and differing demands among the basin 
countries for the water obscure a basin-wide perspective and frustrate coopera-
tive action to manage and develop the resource efficiently." 
Moving to the final component of the model, power asymmetries, 
calculation of the power ratio among riparian states involves three elements: the 
states' overall political/military/economic power levels; the states' technologi-
cal power to disrupt or alter the river basin; and the states' geographical power 
reflected in a more advantageous upstream or less advantageous downstream 
position with respect to the river. These last two components frequently 
interrelate with one another in enhancing power asymmetries: for example, the 
escalating industrial waste of a technologically oriented upstream nation may 
create downstream pollution in a shared river basin; or the construction of dams 
by upstream nations can introduce downstream difficulties because of the 
diversion of water (and water resources like fish) from downstream users, and 
the creation of stagnant water that may become contaminated, salty, and/or 
promote diseases. However, many riparian nations in the superior power 
position refrain from exercising that power because of ecological and political 
repercussions. Thus, restraining the exercise of power by stronger upon weaker 
nations is the extent of reciprocal interdependence between them (as well as their 
web of alliances), with the underlying assumptions that such interdependence 
can broaden mutual concerns and that the less evident such interdependence the 
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higher the chances of riparian conflict. In light of Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye's19 two critical dimensions of interdependence — sensitivity (the size and 
speed of the impact of one nation's changes on another) and vulnerability (the 
extent of the availability and cost of alternatives given these changes) — river 
basin conflict could result from either asymmetrical sensitivities and vulnerabilities 
among riparian nations, or mutually high sensitivities and vulnerabilities with 
asymmetrical overall power. With respect to resources in general, Mandel20 
contends that skewed (rather than reciprocal) interdependence seems particu-
larly likely to generate international resource conflict (especially when dealing 
with renewables viewed as basic human needs such as water) because one nation 
is probably taking a lot more than it is giving, fostering frustration and percep-
tions of unfairness in the other nation, and the first nation might become 
increasingly unreasonable in its demands. With specific reference to interna-
tional river basins, Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer21 points out that the "power 
asymmetry" of "upstream-downstream geopolitics of international rivers," in 
which "the upper riparians have distinct advantages in such policy areas as flood 
control and apportionment of water supplies, and especially in river water 
contamination," impedes the chances of successful cooperative bargaining 
outcomes and increases the conflict potential (in contrast to situations where the 
distribution of power is even and/or all parties contribute to a common goal 
without which each would equally suffer). LeMarquand22 reinforces this point 
in noting that "there is no economic incentive for cooperation when an upstream 
country uses an international river to the detriment of a downstream country and 
that country has no reciprocal power over the upstream country." However, as 
Frey and Naff23 contend, conflict over international river basins requires "block-
age" or resistance of the interests of another, so that even with power asymmetry 
downstream nations must possess some ability to thwart the aims of upstream 
nations in order to create tension. 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
In the context of the preceding theoretical model, this study examines 
more specific hypotheses relating to significant controversies on the topic. Out 
of a wide range of possibilities these particular hypotheses emerged as central for 
scrutiny on the basis of their importance in linking up with crucial aspects of 
general debates over resource conflict. 
The first hypothesis relates to the nature of the disputed issue in a river 
basin. LeMarquand24 notes that river disputes focusing on border definition 
issues, with a river forming a shared boundary between nations, are quite 
different from river disputes focusing on water consumption issues, with a river 
cutting across two or more nations. The first type of issue often reflects 
geopolitical sphere-of-influence concerns, while the second frequently reflects 
ecological water quality concerns. More specifically, the first seems to be more 
symptomatic of intractable zero-sum tradeoffs among contending parties (typi-
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cal of the general pattern of international border disputes),25 with each side 
desiring control of a larger share of the river bed leaving less for anyone else; 
while the second — especially when dealing with "common pool" pollution 
control issues—appears to be more symptomatic of potentially resolvable non-
zero-sum tradeoffs among relevant parties, with solutions possible that improve 
the plight of everyone involved in use of a river. Viewed from a security 
standpoint, shared environmental degradation in the form of water pollution 
seems to pose a much more long-term, indirect, and subtle threat than does 
mutual disagreement about how a river defines one's border. On the basis of this 
logic the following hypothesis emerges: 
International river basin disputes over border definition issues tend 
to exhibit more severe conflict than disputes over pollution control 
issues. 
The controversy inherent in this contention is evident through the opposite 
argument that in today's world, with growing usable water scarcity and the end 
of Cold War machinations, practical life-threatening water quality issues might 
generate more urgent need and national passion than the more symbolic power-
related sphere-of-influence concerns. 
The second hypothesis deals with whether human action or natural forces 
trigger any disruption in a river basin. More specifically, there appears to be a 
considerable distinction between water apportionment concerns initiated by the 
technological intrusion of dams or other forms of river flow alteration, and those 
concerns initiated by the natural intrusion of flooding. The underlying assump-
tion is that the human-initiated disruptions would generate greater hostility and 
more intractable disputes than natural disruptions because of the lower sense of 
legitimacy and inevitability involved. Barnet26 supports this claim with the more 
general assertion that when nations perceive resource pressures as resulting from 
intentional human manipulation rather than unintended and/or natural forces, the 
resentment is greater and the conflict potential is higher. From a security 
perspective, premeditated and intentional intrusions in a wide variety of contexts 
traditionally elicit more belligerent responses than accidental or uncontrollable 
disruptions. The following hypothesis thus emerges: 
Among international river basin disputes over water apportion-
ment, human-initiated technological disruptions involving dam 
construction or other river flow alterations tend to exhibit more 
severe conflict than natural disruptions involving flooding. 
The controversy here is the possibility that since flooding may cause more 
chaotic and widespread damage than controlled technological intrusions, fric-
tion among affected parties could — contrary to the hypothesis — be more 
intense for those natural disasters than for human-initiated alterations in a river 
basin. 
30 
Conflict Quarterly 
Both of the hypotheses address the severity of conflict (the dependent 
variable), which requires further delineation in the context of international river 
basins. This study attempts to distinguish among three levels of conflict (low, 
medium, and high) based on how protracted disputes are over time; how close 
disputes are to breaking out into tangible military confrontations (and, if such 
confrontations do emerge, how destructive they are); and how much progress 
occurs in resolving issues of disagreement. Thus a low-severity river dispute 
may be one where the problem is simply the absence of a functioning and 
integrated management system for an international river basin and where 
progress has been relatively smooth and cooperative, while a high-severity river 
dispute may involve seemingly permanently unresolved issues and heated verbal 
recriminations from all sides and/or violent clashes. In some cases a conference 
among riparian nations may signify the beginning of a dispute since they 
recognize for the first time which issues divide them, while in others it may 
signify the end of a dispute as they finally reach agreement on key contentious 
issues. Unlike many other conflict arenas, in the river basin context the 
likelihood or level of violence seems less crucial in determining the severity of 
conflict than the degree of contentiousness and acrimonious stalemate. 
Briefcase studies of major international river basin disputes serve as the 
basis for assessing the hypotheses. The selection of these case studies involved 
careful scanning of existing comparative assessments, and of the most crucial 
river basins in the world to ensure inclusion of those cases exhibiting significant 
international river management problems. The cases chosen are from the 
twentieth century because this is the period when technology has been most 
available for altering river basins (particularly for purposes of hydroelectric 
power and large systemic irrigation); pollution concerns have gradually moved 
to the forefront of national resource agendas; and the supply-demand squeeze has 
been most acute for river water use. In order to explore fairly the validity of the 
hypotheses, cases considered vary considerably in the level of friction they 
exhibit. While by necessity the coverage does not include every major interna-
tional river basin — the earth contains over two hundred river basins shared by 
two or more nations — the sample encompasses a representative and relatively 
broad selection: the fourteen cases include three apiece from North America and 
the Middle East, two each from Europe, South Asia, and Africa, and one from 
East Asia and South America. Figure 2 displays general background information 
on these cases. The case name is of the principal waterway involved, the case 
dates are those of the most recent phase of dispute (in some cases these are 
approximate), and the primary participants are the major riparian antagonists in 
the dispute. Because the sample size is small and the sources for the case studies 
are by necessity secondary ones, the examination of the model and hypotheses 
through the cases is more in the category of illustration than of proof or disproof. 
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CASE STUDIES 
The treatment of each case is parallel in order to maximize both compa-
rability and generalizability of findings. Case analyses include brief histories of 
the river basin disputes and key relevant issues, application to the cases of the 
three components of the theoretical model (non-cooperative setting, environ-
mental imbalance, and power asymmetry), and assessment of the existing level 
of (and potential for) international river basin conflict. Although the sparse and 
secondary nature of the source materials for the cases places a limit on the 
reliability and validity of assessments made, the information needed to test the 
hypotheses is generally both readily attainable and not subject to major contro-
versy. 
Colorado River 
After a sustained period of conflict over water apportionment needed to 
serve the competing demands of the southwest region of the United States and 
the northwest region of Mexico, in 1961 the dispute focused on water quality 
because the Wellton-Mohawk irrigation project in southern Arizona began to 
discharge highly saline drainage waters into the Colorado River. These saline 
deposits from the irrigation project compounded the river's already growing salt 
levels due to increased American upstream diversion of water for hydroelectric 
power and to associated rising pollution. As a consequence, the water severely 
damaged croplands in the Mexicali Valley, and the Mexican government 
formally protested the decline in water quality. While the American State 
Department had initially denied any responsibility for water quality deteriora-
tion, it later decided "a settlement was imperative to improve binomial relations, 
defuse domestic dissent in Mexico, and forestall a Mexican motion to take the 
matter to the World Court."27 After over a decade of intense and complex 
negotiations, in 1973 the United States and Mexico reached an agreement in 
which the United States pledged to provide Mexico with low-salinity water 
through the American construction of a desalinization plant, and the Mexicans 
in turn were willing to accept less-than-perfect parity with the United States in 
water quality. 
Turning to the application of the theoretical model in this case, the setting 
was only mildly non-cooperative. Mexico and the United States, while having 
significant cultural and economic differences, have maintained an overall 
political alliance that the Colorado River issue did not break down. However, 
Richard Bath28 points out that this dispute "became an increasingly emotional 
issue tied to Mexican nationalism." Some previous progress had occurred in 
international management of the river, most significantly through the water 
treaty in 1944 between the two nations. Secondly, a severe environmental 
imbalance existed in this case. Barnet29 substantiates the Colorado River's 
scarcity of usable water by noting that this has been the most "water short" river 
basin in the United States, serving fifteen million people and containing large 
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storehouses of energy resources like coal, oil, natural gas and uranium (which 
accelerate the rate of exploitation and pollution). Furthermore, the Mexican-
American inequality in usable water during the dispute was severe:30 "farmers in 
the United States were receiving good quality water a few miles upstream, while 
the water Mexico was forced to accept was unusable." Thirdly, the power 
asymmetry in this case was mild, with the United States having overwhelming 
technological power to disrupt the river basin and Mexico having little reciprocal 
political, economic, or military power to resist, but also with a restraining 
interdependence forcing mutuality of concern. Although the real power dispar-
ity between the United States and Mexico has been huge, LeMarquand" points 
out that the restraints on the Americans were "the desire by the United States to 
be seen by the world, and especially the developing countries, as a responsible 
riparian, the lingering doubt over the validity of its legal position, and the need 
to maintain good relations with Mexico for the resolution of other important 
bilateral issues." Especially important were the international image of the United 
States as "a superpower less than generous in dealing with the consequences of 
its domestic activities in Mexico," and the potential linkage of river dispute 
resolution to other bilateral contentious security issues, such as illegal immigra-
tion and drug trafficking. 
This case centered on ecological, usable water apportionment issues, and 
the disruption (in this case an irrigation project and accelerated exploitation and 
pollution) resulted from human-initiated actions on the part of the upstream 
nation. Despite this tension-enhancing context, the conflict was somewhat 
muted (although sustained for a time) because the setting was reasonably 
cooperative and the bilateral interdependence was reasonably restraining. The 
environmental imbalance alone was not sufficient to generate severe conflict in 
this case. 
Columbia River 
In March 1944 both the United States and Canada recognized a mutual 
need to develop further the potential of the Columbia River basin, which has 
more hydroelectric power capacity than any other river system in North America.12 
The American motives were to even out the peak flow and achieve flood control 
(through the construction of Canadian storage facilities) so as to enhance power 
generation, while the Canadian motives were to supplement benefits from 
domestic exploitation with revenue from American downstream use.11 The 
resulting International Joint Commission did not reach its conclusions until 
1959, primarily because of differences of opinion on how to define and assess the 
costs and benefits involved. Controversies about management structures further 
delayed negotiations: in the United States, the unresolved issue of public versus 
private ownership of electric power projects caused complications;14 and in 
Canada, the lack of clear jurisdictional supremacy between the provinces and the 
federal government resulted in conflicting objectives between British Columbia 
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and the Canadian federal government.35 Finally, in January 1961 Canada and the 
United States signed a treaty (not fully ratified until September 1964) calling for 
Canada to construct at its own expense storage facilities in three dams, and in 
return for Canada to receive a huge increase in hydroelectric power production 
and a significant lump sum payment from the United States for the resulting flood 
control benefits. 
With regard to the application of the theoretical model, the setting was 
devoid of significant cross-national antagonism because of the long history of 
Canadian-American cooperation (despite some Canadian resentment of Ameri-
can economic domination). As Neil Swainson36 notes, the river basin seemed 
"ideally suited" to integrated international management because of the long 
tradition of mutually friendly relations and similar political systems. Prior joint 
success in international river management had also occurred, exemplified by the 
1909 Canada-United States Boundary Waters Treaty that was the basis for the 
establishment of the International Joint Commission. Moreover, there appeared 
to be no significant environmental imbalance in this case: neither scarcity in 
terms of inadequate quantity and quality of usable water nor maldistribution of 
usable water was an issue here. Two opposite (and mutually canceling) power 
asymmetries existed, as Canada was in the superior upstream river position but 
the United States possessed vastly more aggregate power; in any case a 
restraining reciprocal interdependence fostered cooperation, for example, the 
United States wished to reach agreement on this issue in order to create a "good 
image" of the United States in Canada.37 
The key issue in this case was not ecological usable water apportionment, 
and the upstream nation did not engage in human-initiated disruption of the river 
basin; Swainson38 emphasizes that the Columbia basin was not one "in which 
viable consumptive use by an upstream riparian produces threats to the very 
existence of the downstream watercourse." Instead, natural flooding concerns 
and hydroelectric power needs were at the core. The severity of conflict in this 
case was quite low, with key disagreements being resolved relatively smoothly 
and few verbal recriminations occurring on the international level. However, 
there was "often acrimonious debate" characterized by "a good deal of disso-
nance"39 on the issue within Canada (between British Columbia and the federal 
government), particularly during the post-1954 period. 
Danube River 
The Danube is the world's most international river with eight riparian 
nations—Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Romania, the 
former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia. Originally oriented strictly 
toward navigation disagreements, the Danube Commission was first established 
in 1878 but revitalized itself after World War II in 1948. More recently, issues 
of concern have expanded beyond navigation to include hydroelectric power 
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generation and toxic pollution management. Because of the concern about this 
last issue, in 1985 representatives from the eight European nations bordering the 
river signed a non-binding Danube Declaration announcing their broad willing-
ness to cooperate on waterway management issues, although this harmonious 
impulse has yet to experience successful implementation. 
Application of the theoretical model to this case is complicated because 
of the large number of parties involved. The river basin setting has been full of 
historical national antagonisms, many of which related to broader East-West 
tensions that impeded cooperation: for example, Austria and Yugoslavia at-
tempted —for political reasons linked to Cold War competition—to prevent the 
Soviet Union from expanding its influence beyond navigation.40 While there was 
a solid backdrop of previous cooperation among the riparian nations, successful 
agreements were largely bilateral rather than multilateral in nature and thus did 
not approach integrated river basin management. As to environmental imbal-
ances, despite the worsening water quality there has been no significant scarcity 
of usable water, as riparian nations have not extensively used the Danube ' s water 
supply for agricultural purposes and industrial uses have not yet reached limits.41 
However, inequality has been stark in the waterway:42 "the benefit from the 
development of the Danube and the pollution costs are not evenly distributed 
among the riparian countries," as "the more prosperous upper riparians depend 
on the Danube mostly for industrial and waste disposal purposes and benefit 
disproportionately from the water power potential, while the less-developed 
lower riparians are more dependent on the river for drinking water, irrigation, 
fisheries, and on a large tourist industry at the Black Sea." Lastly, the power 
asymmetry among the riparian states has been extreme:43 the upper riparians — 
Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia — are overall more politically and 
economically powerful, have less direct interest in improving water quality 
because of the nature of their uses of the river, possess greater control of the 
river's energy potential, and are more responsible for significant discharges in 
the river; while the lower riparians have been weaker but have had much more 
to gain through cooperative policies especially with regard to water quality. 
Interdependence has acted, however, as a somewhat constraining force in 
dealing with this disparity.44 
This river basin case has centered neither on ecological usable water 
apportionment issues nor on geopolitical sphere-of-influence issues, and it has 
not concerned itself primarily with either human-initiated or natural disruption 
in the waterway. Instead, gradually intensifying concerns about pollution and 
hydroelectric power have been the focus. The conflict level has been quite low, 
to the point where Albert Lepawsky45 calls it one of the "best managed traffic 
channels in the world" run by "one of the most effective international bodies of 
its kind." 
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De La Plata River 
The De La Plata River basin, formed by the confluence of the Parana and 
Uruguay Rivers, encompasses parts of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. Although disputes over the river trace back into the nineteenth 
century, the most recent round of tensions began in 1966 when Argentina invited 
Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay to discuss issues of basin development. 
In February 1967 the first conference of foreign ministers from the five riparian 
states took place and led to a joint declaration of intentions and to the establish-
ment of the Intergovernmental Coordination Committee of the De La Plata Basin 
Countries. However, inefficiency and friction have resulted from this structure46 
because the range of subjects discussed included such non-water topics as 
education, railroads, and communications, and the primary negotiators were 
diplomats who lacked the professional training to understand the problem's 
intricacies fully rather than technical experts. The most important issues of 
dispute and uses of the river were first and foremost hydroelectric power 
generation and secondarily navigation; other concerns/uses included waste 
disposal, industrial applications, and irrigation.47 Turning to the theoretical 
model, the river basin setting has generally been an antagonistic one, with 
Argentina and Brazil vying for regional hegemony.48 Complicating these 
interactions, by providing different levels of perceived legitimacy and repre-
sentativeness to government positions and increasing resentment is the excep-
tion of Paraguay to democratic rule in the region. However, some progress had 
occurred prior to 1966 in resolving bilateral (though usually not multilateral) 
conflicts in the basin: for example, Argentina and Uruguay resolved their 
differences concerning boundary-setting on the Uruguay River in 1961. In terms 
of environmental imbalances, there has been no usable water scarcity in the river 
basin, but there certainly has been an unequal use of (and reliance on) hydroelec-
tric power, with Brazil by far the dominant user. This inequality and high rate 
of Brazilian exploitation has led to conflict and resentment, particularly with 
regard to Argentina.49 As to power asymmetry, Argentina and Brazil have 
dominated in terms of size, natural and economic resources, and population, but 
the reciprocal power of the three smaller nations of Bolivia, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay has enabled them to play a "pendular game" between the two large 
nations on river issues, alternatively bestowing favors on one or the other.50 
In this case no human or natural disruption triggered conflict; rather it has 
been the product of incremental changes in river basin management and 
utilization. The focus of existing disputes has been neither ecological usable 
water apportionment nor geopolitical sphere-of-influence concerns. The sever-
ity of conflict exclusively over river issues has been low, constrained to some 
extent by the perceived benefits of mutual cooperation. 
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Euphrates River 
For centuries Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have used the Euphrates River to 
irrigate surrounding lands, but early in the twentieth century these three riparian 
states developed plans to expand the management of the river's resources for 
purposes of flood control, hydroelectric power generation, and very large-scale 
irrigation. Throughout most of this century, the absence of integrated planning 
did not result in conflict among these nations. However, the construction in 1973 
by Turkey of the Keban dam and by Syria of the Tabqa dam (later renamed 
the ath-Thawrah dam) precipitated a major Syria-Iraq water crisis that brought 
the two nations to the brink of war. Iraq claimed in April 1975 that Syria had 
reduced the river's flow to an intolerably low level (indeed the flow had 
decreased by seventy-five percent), endangering the livelihood of Iraqi farmers 
whose agricultural land is almost fifty percent irrigated.51 Syria and Iraq then 
exchanged threats, and Iraq indicated readiness to take any action necessary to 
restore the flow of Euphrates water while Syria claimed it was passing on to 
Iraq most of the water received from Turkey.52 As the situation worsened 
through May and troops allegedly massed on both sides of the frontier, Saudi 
Arabia attempted to mediate (along with reputed Soviet mediation behind the 
scenes), and in June Syria and Turkey reached an understanding in which Syria 
released substantially larger amounts of Euphrates waters to Iraq. After this 
resolution the threat of war receded, although relations between the two nations 
remained quite strained. While water issues have not caused significant conflict 
among the riparian states since that time, tensions seem likely to occur now that 
Turkey's massive Ataturk Dam began operating in 1992 depriving Syria of vital 
water supplies.53 Turkey's motive in this construction has been the perceived 
need to develop her relatively neglected eastern provinces.54 
Addressing the theoretical model, the river basin setting was ripe with 
pre-existing antagonisms. As Naff and Maison55 point out, "the spring 1975 
crisis was prompted by long-standing Syrian-Iraqi tensions and by rising Syrian 
fears of Iraqi subversion in Syria." Furthermore, negotiations prior to 1974 
among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq had proven to be largely ineffective.56 A 
complicated set of environmental imbalances characterize the Euphrates River 
Basin. With regard to scarcity, the river basin has contained "a marked surplus 
of water" and "neither Turkey, Syria, nor Iraq is facing an imminent water 
shortage."57 But the Turkish and Syrian dams created a potential scarcity of 
water for agriculture, and with future dam projects in the works there could be 
"severe shortages in dry spells of more than three to four years duration."58 
Moreover, there has been significant inequality in the distribution of water, 
with the most upstream nation — Turkey — having the greatest access and the 
most downstream nation — Iraq — having the smallest access. In terms of 
power asymmetry, Turkey has been not only in "the commanding riparian 
position" but also has had the greatest military power, with Iraq and Syria about 
equal at a lower level. Despite this gap the relatively positive relations, 
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including trade interdependence, between Turkey and Syria have served to 
restrain to some degree Syrian-Iraqi tensions.59 
In this case the contentious concerns focused on ecological issues of 
usable water apportionment, and the disruption was human-initiated dam con-
struction. The level of conflict involved here was severe, given the heightened 
tensions of the 1974-75 water crisis, and as Ewan Anderson60 points out, 
"tensions may also escalate" in the future, "given the extensive irrigation and 
hydroelectric power projects in hand." 
Ganges River 
The dispute over the Ganges River began in 1951, when Bangladesh was 
still eastern Pakistan. The issues at stake with India in this conflict were from the 
beginning the uses of the river for irrigation, hydroelectric power, flood control, 
navigation, and drinking water.61 Indian construction of the Farakka barrage in 
1975 intensified the conflict, and in 1976 Bangladesh lodged an angry formal 
protest with India against continued operation of the barrage because the 
diversion of the Ganges dry season flow "disrupted fishing and navigation, put 
irrigation pumps out of action, brought unwanted salt deposits into rich and 
valuable farming soil, and thus created a chain of adverse reactions" in this 
downstream nation.62 Although negotiations since that time have continued, 
both nations have come up with concrete proposals for resolution, third party 
mediators have received invitations, and the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers 
Commission has attempted to satisfy both nations' minimal requirements, no 
settlement has as yet emerged. 
Applying the theoretical model, it becomes apparent that South Asia has 
traditionally been a setting for antagonism between India and Pakistan due to 
religious differences and sphere-of-influence concerns, although relations be-
tween India and Bangladesh (after its independence in 1971) admittedly have 
been considerably more cordial; and there was no record of success in joint 
Ganges management before 1951. The environmental imbalances seemed to be 
quite significant. Both Bangladesh and India agreed that the scarcity was severe 
— reflected by the insufficient supply of Ganges water during the dry season 
required to meet their needs63 — and this inadequate supply combined with 
growing demand due to rapid population increases has transformed a once 
prosperous region into one of the poorest areas in the world.64 Furthermore, 
inequality in usable water availability is evident by the squeeze negatively 
affecting Bangladesh (the downstream nation) much more than India (the 
upstream nation). This inequality is linked to a power asymmetry: India is much 
more powerful overall than Bangladesh and also is in the superior riparian 
position; and without significant restraining interdependence, India appears to 
have few incentives to make significant concessions in order to resolve the 
dispute. 
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In this case ecological usable water apportionment was at the core, and a 
human-initiated disruption (the Farakka dam) intensified the dispute. The 
severity of the conflict appears to be medium, given the protracted length of the 
dispute and the extent of Bangladesh frustration. 
Indus River 
Home to one of the world's oldest and largest irrigation networks, the 
Indus River basin was the object of serious dispute even before the partition of 
the subcontinent. After partition in 1947, the most recent conflict erupted in 
April 1948 when India, in order to establish territorial claims, stopped the flow 
of water to Pakistan through the Indian canals. Although India resumed the flow 
from the canals in May, Pakistan had become alarmed because "it suddenly 
realized that India, as the upper riparian, had the capacity to turn West Punjab in 
to a desert."65 After an innovative proposal by the former chair of the American 
Tennessee Valley Authority and interest in financial support for this proposal 
from the World Bank, negotiations began on the Indus dispute in Washington in 
1952. Concerns about irrigation for agriculture and hydroelectric power domi-
nated the discussions. Although there were "wide divergences among the 
disputants,"66 India and Pakistan finally agreed to a complicated settlement of the 
issue in 1960. This agreement has been hailed as a "triumph" of international 
river basin management and has been "scrupulously observed" even during the 
two India-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971.67 
Turning to the theoretical model, as the Ganges case noted, India and 
Pakistan have had a tradition of antagonism since their independence, and with 
specific respect to Indus River basin issues a mutual atmosphere of "suspicion 
and bitterness" prevailed in which separate sovereignty rather than shared 
interdependence was the norm.68 Prior to 1948 no progress had occurred in 
regional river management because of the recency of the partition of the 
subcontinent. Environmental imbalances wim respect to the Indus were only 
mild, as the scarcity of usable water in the region was not severe and the 
inequality of access between India and Pakistan was not huge. However, the 
riparian power asymmetry was significant—as Lepawsky69 notes, India was "in 
a position to appropriate much of me river's crucial water supply and starve out 
downstream Pakistan." Furthermore, there was little restraining reciprocal 
interdependence between India and Pakistan, although their allies encouraged 
settlement out of "die fear of consequences of an Indo-Pakistani war precipitated 
around the Indus waters dispute."70 
This dispute involved tension over ecological water issues due to a 
human-initiated disruption — the Indian stoppage of the flow to Pakistan. The 
conflict level was medium because, although the antagonism and differences of 
opinion were significant, the outside mediation by the World Bank helped to 
mute existing hostility. 
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Jordan River 
The Jordan River basin has by widespread agreement presented the most 
intractable water management problems in the Middle East. Four hostile riparian 
states — Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria — share the basin, and the main 
problems have emerged between Israel and Jordan, who are the most dependent 
on the Jordan River for their water. Prior to World War II, numerous utilization 
schemes emerged primarily for irrigation purposes, but all failed due to regional 
antagonisms. When Israel became an independent state and the Arab-Israeli war 
broke out in 1948, the difficulties of water management worsened. After the war 
ended, each of the riparian states attempted on its own in a piecemeal fashion to 
manage the water problems it faced. Naff and Matson71 contend that the increase 
in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was a major factor leading to the 1967 June 
War, and John Cooley72 more specifically asserts that Israel went to war "partly 
because the Arabs had unsuccessfully tried to divert into Arab rivers Jordan 
River headwaters that fed Israel." The aftermath of the 1967 war had direct 
implications for the management of the basin: Israel's occupation of the Golan 
Heights prevented the Arab states from diverting the headwaters of the Jordan, 
and Israeli occupation of the West Bank, through extensive irrigation efforts, has 
had a critical impact on the entire nation's water supply. Attacks by the Palestine 
Liberation Organization in 1968-69 included raids against water installations, 
and Israeli responses included putting a Jordanian canal out of commission to 
pressure that state into opposing the PLO. Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s 
Israel expanded its water use and water efficiency, and to a lesser extent Jordan 
followed the same course. However, no regional solution has emerged, and 
unilateral efforts increasingly raise the specter of conflict. 
Applying the theoretical model, few settings have experienced the inten-
sity of antagonism as has the Jordan basin. As Anderson73 points out, although 
the basin is clearly well suited to integrated development, "all schemes proposed 
so far have failed as a result of the extreme enmity between the Arabs and Israel" 
rooted in, though not limited to, religious differences. The absence of past 
success in multilateral management efforts has only reinforced the non-coopera-
tive atmosphere. The environmental imbalances in the basin have been excep-
tionally high. As Selig Taubenblatt74 notes, "the scarcity of water has weighed 
upon the region's day-to-day life since prehistoric times," and "in Israel, Jordan, 
and the West Bank the demand for water continues to grow well in excess of 
availability." Naff and Matson75 assert the dire prediction that "by 1995, Israel, 
Jordan, and the West Bank will have depleted virtually all of their renewable 
sources of fresh water if current patterns of consumption are not quickly and 
radically altered." Moreover, there has been a highly skewed distribution of 
Jordan basin water: "equitable apportionment among riparian countries in the 
basin has always been difficult,"76 for "Israel still consumes roughly five times 
as much water per capita as each of its less industrialized and less intensively 
farmed neighbors."77 As to power asymmetries, Frey and Naff78 point out that 
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"Israel enjoys an upper riparian position and overpowering military advantage 
with respect to Jordan," with little reciprocal interdependence having restrained 
adversarial interests. 
The Jordan River basin dispute has focused on extremely bitter usable 
water apportionment issues, and the conflict stems from human-initiated disrup-
tion (diversion of water flow) and over-exploitation of the river's resources. The 
level of conflict involved appears to be the highest in this study. Anderson79 
concludes that "the Jordan River has been the scene of more severe international 
conflicts over water than the other two systems of the Middle East, and it remains 
by far the most likely flash point for the future." 
Mekong River 
Flowing down from China and Burma into Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
and Thailand, the Mekong River basin has traditionally been one of the most 
underdeveloped in the world, with few dams or effective irrigation systems in 
place. In response to United Nations initiatives to help one of the poorest regions 
in the world, the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower 
Mekong Basin (the Mekong Committee) emerged in September 1957 composed 
of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. The goal of the group was the 
comprehensive management and development of the water resource of the lower 
Mekong basin for hydroelectric power, irrigation, flood control, drainage, 
navigation improvement, and drinking water supply.80 The Mekong Committee 
has been since its inception quite effective in collecting basic needed data and in 
providing an institutional framework for managing integrated development of 
the basin.8' 
Taking into account the theoretical model, the Mekong River basin has 
been a relatively tense setting, where antagonisms have recently surfaced, 
particularly between Vietnam and Cambodia over both cultural and territorial 
issues. Prior to the establishment of the Mekong Committee, no significant 
cooperative management of the river had occurred. Environmental imbalances, 
however, have not been central to this river basin, as there has been no scarcity 
of usable water and the Committee has formulated a distribution program for 
"the equitable sharing of the resources of this international river."82 In terms of 
power asymmetry, while Vietnam has been by far the most militarily powerful 
state in the region, there has been a growing sense of reciprocal interdependence 
and regional perspectives among the lower riparians over river issues even 
during times of temporary military hostilities.83 
The Mekong basin case has focused less on ecological usable water 
apportionment and more on hydroelectric power and navigation issues; and 
negotiations resulted not from human-initiated disruption of the basin but rather 
from natural disruptions like floods. The conflict level has been quite low: 
Prachoom Chomchai84 notes that on river management issues a "close and 
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and Russell Fifield85 comment that Mekong Committee members "have devel-
oped marked confidence in one another's judgment and fairness, and work as a 
friendly and cooperative group;" and Lepawsky86 remarks that the Mekong 
Committee bears watching as a "model for the first stage of international river 
administration, possibly suited for developing regions of the world." 
Nile River 
Although the Nile River's drainage area spans Burundi, the Central 
African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zaire, the principal users of the waterway are Egypt and Sudan, and these two 
nations have experienced the most intense river disputes. Egypt traditionally had 
dominant control of the waterway until the end of the nineteenth century. In the 
early part of the twentieth century, tensions surfaced between Egypt and Sudan 
because of Egypt's growing water demand, but in May 1929 the two nations 
reached the Nile Waters Agreement reaffirming Egypt's advantageous position. 
After World War II, a power struggle in Sudan began between two major political 
parties, and due to population growth and water demand cooperation began to 
break down between these two agricultural irrigation-dependent economies.87 
To cope with these pressures, Egypt increased its irrigation efforts and, after its 
1952 revolution, proceeded with construction of the Aswan dam. New friction 
then arose over the extent to which the dam would be a cooperative venture and 
to which a more equitable water apportionment system would result. More 
specifically, Sudan resented not being consulted about the dam and reacted with 
"alarm and protest" to some of the consequences for its people.88 Negotiations 
began between the two states in 1954 but soon failed, and in 1958 a military 
confrontation erupted (not directly triggered by water issues) when Egypt 
dispatched a military force to attempt to reclaim disputed border territory. 
However, in that same year a more sympathetic military regime took control in 
Sudan, and this development combined with Soviet influence — the Soviet 
Union was the key to funding the Aswan Dam project — softened Egypt's 
position. In November 1959 Egypt and Sudan signed the Agreement for the Full 
Utilization of the Nile Waters, which established a Permanent Joint Technical 
Commission and made the water apportionment between the two states some-
what more equitable. Prospects for future cooperation are more ominous 
because, as Starr and Stoll89 note, water shortfalls currently exist in Egypt and by 
the turn of the century the situation could become critical given escalating 
pollution and seemingly unstoppable population growth. 
Turning to the theoretical model, the case involved a history of sporadic 
though not intense antagonism between Egypt and Sudan, and there had been 
some evidence of significant progress toward integrated river management — 
shown by the 1929 accord — prior to the later dispute. Environmental 
imbalances in the river basin have been severe: while both countries have faced 
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usable water scarcity, particularly in drought conditions, in Egypt the squeeze is 
particularly tight because of the uniquely "complete control of the river over the 
economy" in this desert nation;90 and the inequality of the distribution of usable 
water has been perhaps best demonstrated by the significant disparity established 
even by the more equitable 1959 accord, "one of the very few international river 
agreements which has promoted cooperative development despite dispropor-
tionate quota ratios favoring one riparian party.'*" The overall power asymmetry 
between the two states was significant, with Egypt being vastly stronger 
militarily and politically even though Sudan possessed the advantageous upper 
riparian position with respect to Egypt; and restraining reciprocal interdepend-
ence between the two states has not been high, although Britain — Sudan's ally 
at the time — and the Soviet Union have played an international restraining role. 
However, Egypt's position may change in the future,92 "owing to a proliferation 
of small upstream projects, Egypt faces the possibility that its technological 
dominance among the riparians and its controlling political power will decline 
while its vulnerability and dependence as a downstream user increase." 
This case emphasized that usable water apportionment issues, and a 
human-initiated disruption — the Aswan Dam project — was at the root of the 
dispute. The conflict level in this case seemed medium, as it was intense for a 
brief time but then was effectively resolved. 
Rhine River 
The origin of the attempts to deal with coordinated international action 
over the Rhine River was the Rhine Commission's establishment after the 
Napoleonic Wars at the 1815 Congress of Vienna. At that time the primary 
concern was navigation, as the river has carried a larger volume of freight than 
any other in the world.93 Later the attention of the Commission turned more to 
pollution control, as the common nickname for the Rhine has been the "sewer of 
Europe."94 Key issues have included oxygen depletion problems, thermal 
discharges, oil wastes, high salt concentrations, and toxic substances, including 
pesticides and heavy metals. The International Commission for the Protection 
of the Rhine Against Pollution emerged in 1950 on a temporary basis and in 1963 
became more permanent. Of the pollution difficulties solving the salt concen-
tration problem has been "a major diplomatic priority within the basin;" 
however, even on this issue the Rhine ministers "have had difficulty reaching 
conclusive agreement."95 The recent "catastrophic poisoning" of the Rhine river 
after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster96 has heightened the level of concern among 
the riparian states. Four nations bordering the major stem of the river have been 
most critical in these discussions — France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. 
In terms of the theoretical model, the setting during the time period of the 
case has been relatively cooperative (French-German tensions receded some-
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what after World War II), and previous progress on navigation issues has 
provided hope for pollution cooperation. In terms of environmental imbalances, 
the riparian states have differed markedly in terms of how victimized they are by 
river pollution and thus are deprived of usable water — Switzerland being the 
uppermost riparian has suffered the least, while the Netherlands being the lowest 
has suffered the most. Yet inequities in terms of willingness to pay the costs of 
pollution abatement have followed a different pattern:97 for example, Switzer-
land has contributed only a tiny proportion of the salt that enters the Rhine — 
about two percent—but has paid six percent of the storage costs for dealing with 
salt waste in France; and the Netherlands has paid a significantly higher 
proportion of the pollution abatement costs than either of the two major polluters 
— France and Germany. As to power asymmetry, the pre-eminent political, 
military, and economic power of France and Germany clearly has reinforced the 
imbalance in pollution abatement payments; but there has been some sense of 
regional interdependence and "a desire for 'solidarity' within co-basin coun-
tries," despite continuing emphasis on national sovereignty, desires "to shift 
environmental pressure to other Rhine basin countries," and mixed internal 
support for pollution abatement expenditures.98 
The Rhine dispute has emphasized usable water apportionment, and a 
gradual growth of pollution levels (as opposed to a sudden disruption) triggered 
the riparian concerns. The severity of the dispute has been quite mild, however, 
with little enmity among riparians over most water-related issues and the main 
obstacle being failure to discover a workable general solution rather than 
contentious friction among states. 
Rio Grande River 
The longest case considered in this study is the American-Mexican 
dispute over the Chamizal area (near El Paso) of the Rio Grande. In 1864 a flood 
moved six-hundred acres of land from the Mexican side of the river to the United 
States side, changing the boundary between the two countries. The International 
Boundary Commission (later the International Boundary and Water Commis-
sion) emerged in 1889 to help resolve the issue, but it was unsuccessful. After 
Canadian arbitration, in 1911 the Commission awarded Mexico the greater part 
of the disputed land, but the United States, under pressure from Texas, refused 
to accept the settlement. Mexico angrily charged that the United States was 
unwilling to negotiate in good faith and violated principles of international law.99 
After several unsuccessful efforts to reach agreement over the years, finally in 
July 1963 the two nations settled the dispute, with the American government 
willing to cover the costs because of President Kennedy's desire to use the 
settlement as a sign of the administration's good faith toward Latin America and 
as a way of undermining leftist charges in Mexico that Americans do not live up 
to their treaties.100 However, "thorny questions of resource utilization and 
pollution remain" concerning the Rio Grande,101 and the extensive American 
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withdrawal of water for irrigation and both nations' hydroelectric power devel-
opment have complicated riparian issues.102 
As to the theoretical model, the setting — somewhat different from the 
Colorado River case — was antagonistic, with relations between the United 
States and Mexico poisoned by this issue to the point of "vehement denuncia-
tions" by Mexico of the United States. "" Having just fought a war in 1848, there 
was not a backdrop of progress in river management issues. With regard to 
environmental imbalances, neither scarcity of usable water nor maldistribution 
of this resource was a key issue. Instead it was a fight over land triggered by a 
change in the river's course. In terms of power asymmetry, the United States 
clearly held a huge overall power advantage, but significant interdependence and 
regional image issues constrained its action. 
This dispute was clearly boundary-oriented, with the Rio Grande forming 
the border between the United States and Mexico. Rather than being over 
ecological water apportionment issues resulting from human disruption, the case 
centered on geopolitical sphere-of-influence issues raised by the change in a 
boundary line caused by a natural flood: as Lepawsky m remarks colorfully, the 
central impediments to settlement were "pressures from powerful property 
owners reluctant to relinquish the patriotic privilege of flying the American flag 
over this disputed piece of real estate." The conflict was quite severe, given the 
extraordinary length of time needed to settle and the heated passions at stake. 
Senegal River 
Located in one of the world's poorest areas, the Senegal River has been 
the focus recently of concerted management efforts by the riparian states of 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. Because "the development of the 
Senegal River offers for the moment the only hope for solving or at least 
alleviating some of the problems of the region,"105 these basin states have 
attempted since their independence to further joint development of the river's 
resources. Originally used primarily for navigation from the coast, attempts 
began in the twentieth century to exploit the agricultural potential of the basin 
through irrigation and after World War II to harness the river's hydroelectric 
power. In January 1962 the four basin states came together and formed the Inter-
State Committee, and with United Nations help began to explore concrete plans 
for using the waterway's resources. Later in March 1968 the Organization of the 
Senegal River States emerged. However, political friction continued throughout 
these efforts, as Senegal and Mauritania disagreed on the partitioning of the river 
waters forming the border between them, and Senegal and Guinea experienced 
ideological differences and personal animosity between their political leaders. 
Finally, in March 1972, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal founded the Organization 
for the Management of the Senegal River, and since that time "the political 
turmoil that embroiled efforts to develop the Senegal River eased" and "the 
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dramatic upheavals of the 1960's no longer characterized the new period."106 
Afterwards some significant progress occurred in the development of the river, 
including the construction of two dams, with substantial financing assistance 
from Arab states as well as some Western nations.107 
Turning to the theoretical model, the setting was mildly antagonistic — 
while the riparian states shared a common French colonial experience, some 
were much more preoccupied with pan-African anti-colonialist sentiment than 
others. Although prior to these states ' independence some moves emerged in the 
direction of international river basin development, none was particularly suc-
cessful or set a standard for post-independence cooperation.m The environmen-
tal imbalance has been stark in terms of scarcity due to the unpredictable pattern 
of floods and droughts, and food production in the river basin has thus "declined 
relative to the needs and the area is less self-sufficient than it was in the 
1960's."109 On the other hand, maldistribution of water benefits within the region 
has not been a significant problem. In a similar fashion, major power asymmetries 
were absent among these extremely poor nations, with upstream nations not 
enjoying special resource advantages, and the reciprocal interdependence was 
high. 
The Senegal basin case has focused on ecological usable water apportion-
ment issues, but the disruptive element was natural — climate-induced—rather 
than human-initiated. The level of conflict involved has been low: LeMarquand110 
points out that "reliance on assistance from the international community has had 
the effect of muting much of the interstate conflict," and that since 1972 truly 
internationally integrated river development has begun. 
Shatt al-Arab River 
The Shatt al-Arab waterway, formed by the confluence of the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers as they flow into the Persian Gulf, has been a site of continuing 
dispute since the seventeenth century. The central issue in the twentieth century 
has been how the waterway delineates the Iraqi-Iranian frontier. The most recent 
wave of conflict began in April 1969, when Iraq announced, in an attempt to 
assert hegemonic control, that the Shatt al-Arab was a part of its territory. Iran 
responded by abrogating a 1937 boundary treaty with Iraq concerning the 
channel. Hostile actions quickly ensued:"1 later in April Iran mined the 
waterway, in May Iran complained to the United Nations about Iraqi mistreat-
ment of its citizens, and by June military units from both sides massed along the 
frontier. Border clashes erupted in April 1971 and continued for years. After Iraq 
brought the issue to the United Nations Security Council in February 1974 and 
much third party mediation occurred, Iraq and Iran finally reached agreement in 
March 1975 about the Shatt al-Arab border. However, after the Shah's rule in 
Iran ended in 1979, Iraq demanded the abrogation of the 1975 treaty, and in the 
spring and summer border incidents began to erupt again. Finally, in September 
46 
Conflict Quarterly 
1980 Saddam Hussein again claimed Iraqi sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-
Arab and initiated the full-scale Iran-Iraq War. This latest phase of conflict 
finally ended when the war ended in August 1988 and a United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force positioned itself on the Iran-Iraq border. 
Addressing the theoretical model, the setting could not have been more 
antagonistic: simultaneously ethnic (Persian versus Arab), religious (Shi'ite 
versus Sunni Moslems), and ideological (modern Arab nationalism versus 
traditional Islamic fundamentalism) differences split the two states, as well as the 
common desire for hegemony in the Gulf. Although Iraq and Iran had signed 
previous agreements regarding the Shatt al-Arab waterway, none was particu-
larly effective. Environmental imbalances were totally absent here, both in terms 
of scarcity and inequality of access to water: as Naff and Matson1 n note, "none 
of the common riparian issues related to consumptive water use or water quality 
has ever arisen in connection with the waterway." In terms of power asymmetry, 
over the period of conflict the overall power ratio between the two states varied, 
with Iran more powerful in the early 1970s but Iraq more powerful by the end of 
the decade."3 Restrained interdependence between the two states was non-
existent during the conflict period. 
The Shatt al-Arab dispute was a classic boundary conflict emerging over 
a border-defining waterway for geopolitical sphere-of-influence reasons. As 
Naff and Matson ' ,4 contend, the conflict over the waterway in recent times has 
been "purely and simply a symptom of the struggle of Iraq and Iran for regional 
supremacy." The dispute could not have been more severe, given that it was 
involved in triggering a major war. 
OVERALL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A review of the fourteen international river basin disputes shows that both 
hypotheses receive considerable support. Figure 3 summarizes the overall 
pattern of the relevant findings concerning the primary issues of dispute, the 
nature of the disruption (if a major disruption occurred in the case), and the 
severity of conflict. Regarding the first hypothesis, the two cases focusing on 
border definition issues — the Rio Grande and Shatt al-Arab Rivers — both 
involved more severe conflict than the four cases dealing with pollution — the 
Colorado, Danube, De La Plata, and Rhine Rivers. Turning to the second 
hypothesis, the six cases triggered by human-initiated technological disruptions 
(dams and water flow diversions) — the Colorado, Euphrates, Ganges, Indus, 
Jordan, and Nile—displayed more severe conflict than the three cases (dealing 
only with those focusing on ecological water apportionment) triggered by 
natural flooding — the Columbia, Mekong, and Senegal Rivers. Despite the 
extreme limitations of the data and the inescapable subjectivity of the judgments 
involved, these two patterns seem reasonably clear-cut. 
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Beyond the hypothesized relationships, interesting insights emerge from 
this comparative assessment concerning the general explanatory model of 
international river basin conflict. In terms of a non-cooperative setting, it is no 
surprise that all of the cases with high mutual antagonism prior to the time of the 
river disputes among riparian nations — the Euphrates, Ganges, Indus, Jordan, 
and Shatt al-Arab rivers — exhibited medium or high levels of conflict once the 
river disputes began. Dealing with environmental imbalances, all of the cases 
with severe overall imbalances—the Colorado, Euphrates, Ganges, Jordan, and 
Nile Rivers — displayed medium or high levels of conflict. However, those 
cases with mixed environmental imbalances exhibited low levels of conflict: the 
Danube and De La Plata cases had high inequality of access to water but low 
scarcity, while the Senegal case had high water scarcity but no significant 
maldistribution of access. Thus both of the imbalances appear necessary for 
conflict to be high, as water scarcity or inequality alone can become tolerable or 
easier to rationalize. Turning to power asymmetries, it is noteworthy that the 
three cases involving equal power ratios among the contending sides — the 
Columbia, Mekong, and Senegal rivers — also display reciprocal interdepend-
ence and low levels of conflict. 
Some relatively expectable patterns, however, are not apparent. There is 
no overarching distinction in terms of the level or type of conflict between river 
disputes involving developed and those involving developing nations, as the 
American dispute over the Rio Grande was in many ways just as severe as the 
Middle Eastern river conflicts, dispelling the notion that Third World riparian 
conflict is somehow more uncontrollable. Bilateral river basin disputes similarly 
do not display a different conflict pattern from multilateral disputes, challenging 
the notion that more limited (in terms of number of parties involved) river 
disputes are easier to resolve. Finally, the more recent (post-1960) river disputes 
do not differ in conflict intensity from the earlier ones, casting doubt on the 
notion that cooperative resource management is increasing as an international 
norm. 
Although the more peaceful cases provide a useful interpretive context, 
those river basin disputes exhibiting the most severe conflict — the Euphrates, 
Jordan, Rio Grande, and Shatt al-Arab cases — deserve separate comment. Of 
the three explanatory elements in the model, the most salient in these cases was 
decidedly the non-cooperative setting, with deep long-standing antagonisms in 
each. Full-scale war either preceded or followed the river basin disputes in three 
of the cases, and in the fourth (the Euphrates River) the riparian nations came to 
the brink of war. However, in none of these cases were water concerns the 
exclusive source of tension. Thus while it may be misleading to suggest that 
water disputes can produce only low-intensity conflict, it would be equally 
misleading to claim that river basin disagreements alone can lead to major war 
among riparian states. 
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Taking a security perspective on the entire set of cases, the question that 
seems to emerge most centrally is what level of conflict resulting from interna-
tional river basin disputes is tolerable. While major war is clearly not the 
dominant outcome, the substantial proportion of cases that are still unresolved 
and/or that display medium or high conflict severity raises crucial military 
defense concerns. As environmental and resource security issues move to higher 
positions on the foreign policy agenda — due to growing public awareness, 
resource scarcity and environmental deterioration, and impact on national power 
— water-related concerns are likely to be at the forefront. These trends link up 
with the growing realization by policy makers that the gap between the survival 
needs of the society and the power needs of the state is dramatically narrowing 
in the resource arena, and that the essence of national security can no longer be 
simply defense against foreign military attack."5 
The policy implications from this study's findings are two-fold. First, 
scarce monitoring and development assistance resources by concerned nations 
and international organizations ought to focus more on those international river 
basins where the conflict potential is greatest — basins with non-cooperative 
settings, environmental imbalances, and power asymmetries, perhaps particu-
larly those involving boundary definition issues or human-initiated technologi-
cal disruptions. Second, attempts to achieve integrated international river basin 
management, effective resource security, and peaceful resolution of differences 
need to emphasize just as much the intangibles — symbolic perceptual status 
issues — as they do on the tangibles — the practical improvement of water 
access. Without such renewed and redirected efforts, water war may be just 
around the bend. 
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FIGURE 1: 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
OVER INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASINS 
Non-Cooperative Setting 
1. Pre-existing General Antagonism 
Among Riparian Nations 
2. Little Previous Progress in 
Regional Management of River Issues 
Background Irritant 
Ï 
Environmental Imbalance 
1. Perceived Growing Scarcity of 
Usable Water 
2. Perceived Growing Inequality in 
Distribution of Usable Water 
Frustration Source 
Power Asymmetry 
1. Skewed Power Ratio Among Riparian 
Nations 
2. Little Restraining Reciprocal 
Interdependence among Riparian Nations 
Immediate Trigger 
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FIGURE 2: 
BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASIN DISPUTES 
River Same 
Colorado 
Columbia 
Danube 
Case Dates 
1961 - 1973 
1944 - 1964 
1948 - present 
Primary Participants 
Mexico - US 
Canada - US 
Austria - Bulgaria -
Czechoslovakia - Germany -
Hungary - Romania - Soviet 
Union - Yugoslavia 
De La Plata 
Euphrates 
Ganges 
Indus 
Jordan 
Mekong 
Nile 
Rhine 
Rio Grande 
Senegal 
Shatt al-Arab 
1966 - present 
1974 - present 
1951 -present 
1948 - 1960 
1948 - present 
1957 -present 
1945 -1959 
1950 - present 
1864-1963 
1962 -1972 
1969 -1988 
Argentina - Bolivia - Brazil -
Paraguay - Uruguay 
Iraq - Syria - Turkey 
Bangladesh - India 
India - Pakistan 
Israel - Jordan 
Laos - Cambodia - Vietnam -
Thailand 
Egypt - Sudan 
France - Germany - Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Mexico - US 
Mali - Mauritania - Senegal -
Guinea 
Iran - Iraq 
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FIGURE 3: 
HYPOTHESIS EVIDENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
RIVER BASIN DISPUTES 
River Name 
Colorado 
Columbia 
Danube 
De La Plata 
Euphrates 
Ganges 
Indus 
Jordan 
Mekong 
Nile 
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Rio Grande 
Senegal 
Shatt al-Arab 
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Pollution 
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Pollution 
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Navigation 
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Hydroelectric Power 
Hydroelectric Power 
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Water 
Navigation 
Hydroelectric Power 
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Irrigation & Drinking 
Water 
Hydroelectric Power 
Irrigation & Drinking 
Navigation 
Irrigation 
Pollution 
Boundary Definition 
Irrigation 
Hydroelectric Power 
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Nature of 
Disruption 
Human-Initiated: Dam 
Nature-Induced: Flood 
None 
None 
Human-Initiated: 
Dam 
Human-Initiated 
Human-Initiated: 
Water Flow Stoppage 
Human-Initiated: 
Water Flow 
Diversion 
Nature-Induced: 
Flood 
Human-Initiated: 
Dam 
None 
Nature-Induced: 
Hood 
Nature-Induced: 
Flood 
None 
Severeity of 
Conflict 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
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